



1. This constraint also applies more generally to efforts by the authorities to counter a
perceived “misalignment” of the exchange rate, i.e., a departure of the actual exchange
rate from its equilibrium level. When a conflict arises between the domestic and external
requirements of monetary policy, the domestic requirement must be “king.”
What Is a Managed Floating Plus Regime?
Before making the case for managed floating plus as the “least worst”
available currency regime option for emerging-market economies, it is
necessary to spell out more concretely what the three aspects of such a
regime would entail. First, I call it “managed” floating to indicate that,
in contrast to pure floating, the authorities could use various policies to
counter some short-term movements in the exchange rate. They would
be permitted, for example, to intervene in the exchange market from
time to time to “smooth” what they regarded as excessive short-term
fluctuations in exchange rates or to maintain market liquidity.
Under managed floating, the authorities would not, however, attempt
to use large-scale, sterilized exchange market interventions to alter the
trend of the exchange rate, which would be determined by market forces.
Nor would they attempt to even out almost all short-term volatility in
the exchange rate, because such volatility serves to sharpen participants’
awareness of market risk. The timing of interest rate movements decided
on domestic grounds could be influenced by the exchange rate. The key
constraint on allowing exchange rate considerations to influence interest
rate decisions is that such external considerations not put in jeopardy the
primary objective of monetary policy: the achievement of a publicly an-
nounced inflation target.1
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Second, I call the regime “floating” to signify that the authorities would
have no publicly announced exchange rate target and that market forces
would be the main determinant of exchange rates.2
Third, the “plus” aspect of managed floating plus has two compo-
nents: an inflation-targeting regime for monetary policy, and an aggres-
sive set of measures to reduce currency mismatching.
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin (2000), and Truman (2001),
I regard inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy that con-
strains discretion in at least four key elements: (1) There is an institutional
commitment to low inflation as a primary objective of monetary policy.
(2) There is public announcement of a numerical target (or sequence of
targets) for inflation, with a specified time horizon for meeting that tar-
get. (3) The central bank is given enough independence from political
pressures and/or government directives that it can set the instruments
of monetary policy as it sees fit in pursuit of its mandate. (4) The con-
duct of monetary policy is subject to transparency and accountability
guidelines, so that the public is informed about both the reasons for
monetary policy decisions and the extent to which the objectives of mone-
tary policy have been attained.
Following the Financial Stability Forum (2000), I define a “currency
mismatch” as a situation in which the currency denomination of a
country’s or sector’s assets differs from that of its liabilities such that its
net worth is sensitive to changes in the exchange rate.3 Note that when
considering currency mismatches on the part of financial intermediaries
(especially banks), it is necessary to consider both their direct and indirect
exposure to exchange rate changes, particularly the indirect exposure that
comes about when their loan customers (nonfinancial corporations and
others) have large currency mismatches. A depreciation of the local cur-
rency that renders many loan customers insolvent would impose large
losses on banks, even if the currency denomination of bank loans matched
that of bank deposits.4
2. Note that, in contrast to managed floating plus, most “intermediate” currency regimes
(including a BBC regime) have a publicly announced target for the exchange rate.
3. Some analysts combine currency, maturity, and liquidity mismatches into a wider concept
of “balance sheet vulnerability” or “international illiquidity”—presumably because of the
links among these mismatches in many emerging-market financial crises. E.g., Chang
and Velasco (1999) regard international illiquidity as a situation in which actual or po-
tential obligations in foreign currency exceed the amount of foreign currency that can be
accessed on short notice; Dornbusch (1998) adopts a similar definition and calls it bal-
ance sheet vulnerability.
4. Although it might be argued that such losses on bank loans should be classified as
credit losses rather than currency mismatches, these losses would be regarded as cur-
rency mismatches under a broader definition that stresses the sensitivity of net worth
(and net income) of banks to changes in the exchange rate.
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Measures to discourage or limit currency mismatching span a wide
field (see discussion below). They can range from allowing the exchange
rate to move enough to continually remind market participants of cur-
rency risk, to publishing data on indicators of currency mismatching
(e.g., the ratio of short-term external debt to international reserves, or
the currency composition of interbank loans), to regulatory provisions
that limit banks’ net open positions in foreign currency, to developing
better hedging mechanisms and deeper capital markets in emerging-market
economies, to proposing more draconian measures (e.g., prohibiting gov-
ernment borrowing in foreign currency, or making foreign currency obli-
gations incurred by domestic residents unenforceable in domestic courts).5
Could one of these two components of the “plus” be discarded in the
interest of streamlining the proposed currency regime? I do not think so.
Indeed, I would argue that inflation targeting and anti-currency mismatching
measures reinforce one another.
If nothing is done to discourage currency mismatching, it is unlikely
that exchange rate considerations will consistently play second fiddle to
low inflation in an inflation-targeting monetary policy.6 Given the high
degree of openness in most emerging-market economies and the extent
to which liabilities are denominated in foreign currency, it is simply un-
realistic to suppose that large exchange rate movements would be ig-
nored. As was suggested above, although some policy actions to counter
excessive short-term exchange rate movements can be reconciled with
inflation targeting, only one nominal anchor can dominate an inflation-
targeting strategy, and that anchor must be low inflation.
Without real progress on reducing currency mismatches, we would
likely see a continuation of fear of floating on the part of emerging-market
economies. In this connection, the empirical work of Hausmann, Panizza,
and Stein (2000) suggests that the greater the dependence on foreign
currency borrowing, the greater the fear of floating on the part of emerging
economies. Moreover, Hausmann and his colleagues report that currency
mismatching explains the cross-country variation in fear of floating bet-
ter than cross-country differences in the pass-through of exchange rate
changes into domestic prices. In short, if we want emerging economies
to exercise monetary policy independence in pursuit of a low inflation
5. The theoretical literature on currency mismatching emphasizes several explanations,
including lack of monetary policy credibility by the sovereign, implicit or explicit bail-
outs of mismatched private borrowers by the government or central bank, lack of do-
mestic financial development in an emerging economy, and commitment or signaling
problems on the part of domestic firms in an emerging-market economy; see Jeanne
(2001).
6. Mishkin (2000) argues similarly that inflation targeting may not be viable in partially
dollarized economies unless prudential or supervisory practices make the system capable
of withstanding exchange rate shocks.
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objective, something has to be done to decrease their vulnerability to
balance sheet crises linked to large currency mismatches.
By the same token, the successful implementation of inflation target-
ing in emerging-market economies should make it easier, ceteris pari-
bus, to reduce currency mismatches. One of the reasons lenders outside
the emerging economies seem to be reluctant to denominate a higher
share of loans in the borrower’s local currency is that this would place
excessive currency risk on the lender. In my conversations with a group
of large private creditors in the Group of Seven (G-7) countries, they
maintained that currency risk was high because many emerging econo-
mies did not have a reliable monetary policy framework in place that
would limit the prospect of strategic devaluation. Without such a policy
framework, it became difficult (in the lenders’ view) to price currency
risk—more difficult (the lenders say) than pricing credit risk. An infla-
tion-targeting framework that contained a credible commitment to low
inflation should be responsive to this concern of foreign lenders. This,
in turn, should increase the supply of local currency-denominated
loans from abroad and decrease the size of the currency-mismatching
problem.
In addition, a lower rate of inflation should contribute to the develop-
ment of greater financial depth in emerging-market economies, thereby
potentially increasing the supply of local currency-denominated loans
from domestic sources. In this connection, Caprio and Demirgüç-Kunt
(1997) document that developing countries suffer from a shortage (rela-
tive to industrial countries) of long-term finance and find that one of the
leading reasons for this shortage is high inflation and unstable macro-
economic policies. They conclude that “attempts to increase the supply
of long-term credit to developing countries without addressing the infla-
tion problem could easily prove to be short-lived or costly” (6).
Similarly, Khan, Senhadji, and Smith (2001) argue that inflation im-
pedes financial development by increasing the severity of adverse selection,
moral hazard, and monitoring problems; in the process, higher inflation
reduces the extension of bank credit and exacerbates credit rationing.
Using a dataset for 168 countries (comprising both industrial and devel-
oping countries) and employing alternative indicators of financial depth
(i.e., domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP, stock mar-
ket capitalization as a share of GDP, private and public bond market
capitalization as a share of GDP, and combinations of the above), Khan
and his colleagues find that after controlling for other factors, inflation
rates above the 3-6 percent range have a significant, negative threshold
effect on financial development.
Last but not least, managed floating plus is meant to be a long-term
currency regime for emerging-market economies that are heavily involved
with private capital markets. Although, during a crisis, capital controls
can create some breathing space within which to make policy adjustments,
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recent research suggests that over time their effectiveness diminishes and
the costs associated with their implementation increase.7 As such, capital
controls are not included as part of the “plus.”
The Case for Managed Floating Plus
In advancing the case for managed floating plus, I maintain that even
plain vanilla managed floating has some significant advantages that are
worth retaining, and more important, that there are grounds for believ-
ing that the performance of a managed floating regime can be improved
significantly when the plus elements are added to it.8 One important
advantage of plain vanilla floating—as was noted above—is the deter-
rent effect that daily fluctuations in the exchange rate should have on
currency mismatching. As Mishkin (1996) argued, such fluctuations “have
the advantage of making clear to firms, banks, and the government that
there is substantial risk involved in issuing liabilities denominated in
foreign currencies.”
Recent empirical support for Mishkin’s proposition has been provided
in a paper by Martinez and Werner (2001). They examine the currency
composition of corporate debt for firms listed on the Mexican Stock Ex-
change during the 1992-2000 period. They find that although the share
of dollar debt in total debt increased from 34 to 49 percent under the
floating rate regime the exposure to depreciation risk for the median
firm decreased sharply as the ratio of dollar debt to exports fell from
3.9 in 1994 to 1.6 in 2000. In addition, they report that whereas firm
size was the main factor explaining the share of dollar debt during the
period of fixed exchange rates (with little attention paid to the distinc-
tion between foreign and domestic sales), exports became the only sig-
nificant variable determining the importance of foreign currency (dollar)
indebtedness during the floating rate regime. In short, in the Mexican
case, floating seems to have been accompanied by better control of cur-
rency risk.9
7. See Ishii, Otker-Robe, and Cui (2001) and Edison and Reinhart (2001) for supporting
evidence on the effectiveness and costs of capital controls. Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay
(2001) present evidence that large private capital flows, which can be detrimental to
growth in a crisis environment, are beneficial for economic growth in the long run.
8. Larrain and Velasco (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the track record of
floating rates in emerging-market economies.
9. A very different conclusion on currency mismatching was obtained by Arteta (2001).
He examines deposit and credit dollarization and their difference (the currency mismatch)
on the part of banks in 40 developing economies and economies in transition during the
1990s. His main result is that, after controlling for other factors, the currency mismatch
of banks is higher under floating rate regimes—a result that he seems to attribute to the
higher cost of hedging under floating.
Institute for International Economics  |  http://www.iie.com48 MANAGED FLOATING PLUS
A second advantage of floating rates worth retaining is the helpful
“cushioning” role that exchange rate flexibility plays in the face of exter-
nal real disturbances, including negative changes in the terms of trade.
This of course remains a key concern for those developing countries in
which primary products account for a large share of exports. In a study
of the experience of 74 developing countries during the 1973-96 period,
Broda (2000) found that output losses after negative terms-of-trade shocks
were much smaller for countries with flexible rate regimes than for those
with fixed rates.
A similar conclusion appears to apply to the post-Asian crisis experi-
ence. Here, Larrain and Velasco (2001) document that emerging-market
economies with flexible rate regimes (Chile, Mexico, and Singapore) had
a more favorable growth experience (as a group) in the 1998-2000 period
than did the “hard peg” economies (Argentina and Hong Kong)—and
this despite the fact that the former group (and especially Chile) was hit
by more adverse terms-of-trade shocks. Ortiz (2000) reports that the cor-
relation between (monthly) exchange rate changes and changes in the
terms of trade switched from positive to negative when Mexico moved
from an adjustable peg to a flexible exchange rate regime.
All this is also consistent with one of the relatively few robust conclu-
sions that has come from bottom-line comparisons of economic perfor-
mance under different currency regimes, namely, that emerging-market
economies with flexible rates have typically shown higher average growth
rates and/or lower volatility of economic growth than economies with
fixed rates.10
Third, floating does seem to increase monetary policy independence.
Although they acknowledge that the existing econometric evidence on
I do not find Arteta’s conclusion persuasive, for three reasons. First, as is argued above
and as is illustrated by the results of Martinez and Werner (2001), when considering
currency risk for financial intermediaries, it is necessary to consider not only the direct
exposure (measured, say, by the currency composition of bank deposits and bank loans)
but also the indirect exposure related to currency risk incurred by bank loan customers
(measured, say, by the ratio of dollar debt to exports and by the share of bank credit
going to producers of tradables). Arteta’s database does not apparently allow him to get
a good fix on this indirect currency exposure of banks.
Second, though Arteta does control for whether or not foreign currency loans and
deposits are allowed in a country, he does not control for specific prudential regulations
for banks that limit currency mismatches; as is shown in table 7.2 below, many develop-
ing countries have such regulations in effect.
Third, as Arteta acknowledges, his data do not cover off-balance-sheet currency expo-
sure by banks; these also could affect the appropriate (more comprehensive) measure-
ment of currency mismatch. Therefore, until we know whether Arteta’s findings would
be robust to inclusion of these factors, I regard the mainstream view of the link between
currency regimes and currency mismatching (i.e., that mismatching will be lower, ceteris
paribus, under floating rates) as the most plausible one.
10. See, for example, Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault (2000).
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monetary policy independence in emerging-market economies is mixed,
Larrain and Velasco (2001) observe that once the estimating equations
take careful note of the differences between de facto and de jure ex-
change rate flexibility and control for the influence of capital controls,
floating does seem to reduce the need to adjust domestic interest rates in
response to interest rate movements abroad. This reinforces the well-
known point emphasized above that a key advantage (or disadvantage)
of flexible (fixed) rates remains the greater scope they provide for using
independent monetary policy to deal with domestic cyclical conditions
that differ from those in the reserve currency economy.
Even more to the main point of this book, managed floating plus should
be able to deliver better economic performance than plain vanilla float-
ing for emerging-market economies heavily involved with private capital
markets. I base this conclusion on four arguments.
11. It is worth noting that not all currency crises in emerging-market economies are con-
tractionary. Examining a sample of 195 crisis episodes for 91 developing countries during
the 1970-98 period, Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2001) found that more than 40 percent of
crises have been expansionary; for the large emerging markets, the corresponding (ex-
pansionary) share of crises was 30 percent.
12. See, e.g., Chang and Velasco (1999); Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000); and Krugman
(2001).
The first argument: If one seeks an explanation for the finding (high-
lighted, e.g., in Calvo and Reinhart 2001) that devaluations in develop-
ing countries have typically been more contractionary and have been
associated with larger credit-rating downgrades than those in industrial
countries, the most likely suspect is severe currency mismatches.11
By now, we have a set of theoretical models that demonstrates how
the combination of large unhedged financial liabilities denominated in
foreign currency (i.e., a large currency mismatch) and a large deprecia-
tion can play havoc with balance sheets, lead to a fall in creditworthi-
ness, and produce both an output contraction and a financial crisis.12 In
addition, there have been enough recent real world examples linking
currency mismatches to contractions or growth slowdowns to illustrate
the connection. And recent empirical work also points to a link between
currency mismatches and output contraction.
As is often noted, in the run-up to the crisis, almost all the Asian crisis
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thai-
land) had relatively large and rising currency or liquidity mismatches
(as indicated by ratios of short-term external debt to international re-
serves and of M2 money balances to reserves); and in 1998, they suffered
Devaluations and Severe Currency Mismatches
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unprecedented declines in growth rates.13 Currency or liquidity mis-
matches also deteriorated in the run-up to the 1994-95 Mexican peso crisis
and contributed to the deep recession experienced by Mexico in 1995.14
Turkey’s banks had a large currency mismatch before their crisis in 2000
and recent projections point to a deep contraction in the Turkish economy
in 2001.15
In Latin America, currency or liquidity mismatches on the eve of the
Asian crisis were on average much smaller and so too was the extent of
the growth slowdowns. A plausible explanation for why Brazilian eco-
nomic growth did not fall off the cliff in 1999 (it rose by 0.5 percent) in
the face of a huge depreciation of the Brazilian real is that very large
currency mismatches in the private sector had already been much re-
duced by the time the depreciation took place.16 Concentrating on currency
crises in the 1990s, Cavallo et al. (2001) find that output contractions
were larger in countries with both large devaluations and high foreign
currency debt burdens.
Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2001) looked at currency crises for a much
larger sample of developing countries and a longer time period (1970-
98). They report that output contractions are significantly related to some
currency-mismatch or debt variables (short-term debt to reserves) but
not to others (the change in the external long-term debt). In this case,
however, potential multicollinearity problems may mean that some of
the effects of currency mismatches are being picked up by other explana-
tory variables (e.g., the precrisis level of private capital inflows, much of
which probably took the form of debt denominated in foreign currency).
Finally, Berg and Patillo (1999) suggest that currency mismatch variables
rank relatively high as leading indicators of currency crises in emerging-
market economies.
Another factor that probably contributed to the contractionary nature
of many past devaluations in developing countries is a sharp decline in
both confidence and capital inflows. Part of that decline, in turn, may
stem from the problem that once a country was forced to abandon the
nominal anchor of the exchange rate peg and had to let the exchange
rate float, there was often no new credible nominal anchor to replace it
(i.e., a monetary growth target was not viewed as a good commitment
13. See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Goldstein (1998), Chang and Velasco (1999).
14. See Calvo and Goldstein (1996) and Goldstein and Turner (1996) for measures of
currency-liquidity mismatch in the run-up to the Mexican crisis.
15. See Bank of England (2001) for net losses on foreign exchange transactions in Turk-
ish banks. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook for December 2001 estimates that the Turk-
ish economy contracted by about 6 percent in 2001.
16. See, e.g., Bevilaqua and Garcia (2000); in addition, Krugman (2000) speculates that
the relatively good growth outcome in Brazil probably also reflected the relatively small
size of the banking sector there.
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mechanism). And without such an anchor, there could only be a weak
expectation that monetary stability would soon be restored.
The lesson I take away from this is that currency depreciations would
become more expansionary in emerging-market economies if currency
mismatches were much reduced in size. Establishing a credible nominal
anchor (i.e., inflation targeting) to replace the nominal exchange rate would
likely also help. This is of course just what managed floating plus seeks
to do.
The second argument: We should recognize that, as long as the currency-
mismatching problem remains unattended to, crisis management in
emerging-market economies—including the role of the IMF—will be in
an uncomfortable box. Again, this was driven home dramatically during
the Asian crisis. When there is a lot of (unhedged) debt denominated in
foreign currency, the appeal of lowering domestic interest rates to allevi-
ate the interest rate burden of highly leveraged firms and to counteract
the anticipated contraction in the real economy needs to be weighed against
the worrisome prospect that lower interest rates could initiate a free
fall of the currency and spawn a wave of bank failures and corporate
insolvencies.
Conversely, raising interest rates to support the exchange rate threat-
ens to exacerbate debt burdens and to reduce aggregate demand in the
face of an already weakening economy. But if the currency mismatch is
small, the prescription of lower interest rates is much easier to imple-
ment, because the adverse balance sheet effects of a lower exchange rate
become less relevant than the traditional expenditure-switching effects
of a depreciation. Because Australia was not faced with a serious cur-
rency mismatching problem, during the Asian crisis it was able to lower
interest rates and to allow the exchange rate to depreciate and to play its
buffering role. As a result, the Australian economy grew by more than 5
percent in 1998.
Krueger (2000) has argued that until the international community finds
a mechanism for preventing the buildup of foreign currency-denominated
liabilities in the domestic financial systems of developing countries, the
IMF’s crisis role will be complex and difficult. Again, managed floating
plus is aimed in good measure at reducing this crisis-management di-
lemma by addressing directly the currency-mismatching problem.
The third argument: I do not find persuasive the contention that the
currency mismatching problem in emerging-market economies (what
Currency Mismatching and Market Imperfections
Currency Mismatching and Crisis Management
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Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999 call “original sin”) reflects a funda-
mental market imperfection that is here to stay.17
The fact that a thriving market for local currency-denominated bor-
rowing (from abroad) does not presently exist for most emerging-market
economies does not mean that such a market could not develop in the
medium term. Recent history is replete with financial markets—ranging
from asset-backed securities to credit derivatives—that did not exist for
long periods but quite rapidly became sizable once they got off the ground.
Creditors in industrial countries already engage in a wide variety of high-
risk activities, including the purchase and underwriting of junk bonds.
It is hard to imagine that domestic currency lending to emerging-
market economies is so “special” that its appropriate pricing will forever
remain outside the realm of the feasible—especially if the threat of stra-
tegic devaluation were reduced by the adoption of inflation-targeting
regimes in more of the larger emerging economies and if the ongoing
effort to strengthen domestic banking systems in developing countries
were to produce more creditworthy counterparties. Australia and South
Africa have long been able to borrow internationally in their own cur-
rencies (and now run floating rate regimes). It has to be admitted that
both countries developed local markets early; but why is it such a great
leap of faith to expect that large emerging economies with relatively
good credit standings (e.g., Chile, China, Hungary, India, South Korea,
Mexico, and Singapore) would soon be able to follow their example?
Perhaps it took the Asian crisis to convince emerging-market economies
of the high vulnerability associated with heavy reliance on foreign currency-
denominated borrowing; indeed, popular indicators of currency mismatch-
ing (such as the ratio of short-term external debt to international reserves)
now suggest smaller mismatches (in Asia) than in the 1996-98 period.
It should also be recognized that data on the currency composition of
debt (which are typically used to document the presence of “original
sin” in emerging-market economies) are not synonymous with currency
mismatching in the presence of hedging markets. Table 7.1 (taken from
Hawkins and Turner 2000) shows the currency composition of debt for
both international bank loans and for international debt securities (as of
the end of 1999). Unlike most studies, table 7.1 also breaks down exter-
nal debt by the type of borrower or issuer. It can be seen that emerging
economies have much smaller shares of debt denominated in their own
currency than do industrial countries, that domestic currency debt is more
17. More precisely, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) define “original sin” as “a situa-
tion in which the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long
term, even domestically”(p. 330). They argue that as long as “original sin” prevails, in-
vestments in emerging-market economies will inevitably carry either a currency mis-
match or a maturity mismatch. Knight, Schembri, and Powell (2000) and Kenen (2001)
conclude (as do I) that the “original sin” hypothesis is excessively pessimistic.
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prevalent in emerging economies for international bank loans than for
international debt securities, and that South Africa and Australia do in-
deed show (relative to the majority of emerging economies) high shares
of debt denominated in domestic currency. But note that, for some types
of borrowing, Hong Kong, Thailand, the Czech Republic, and Poland
also show some nontrivial shares of domestic currency debt.
Even more to the point at hand, table 7.1 gives the  original currency
composition of the debt—not the final composition. Suppose, for example,
Table 7.1 Share of external debt denominated in the domestic
currency, end of 1999  (percent)
Loans from    
international banks International debt securitiesa  
    
Other Corporate Financial Public
Economy Banks  borrowers issuers institutions sector
Argentina 5 0 3 1 2
Chile 8 0 0 0 0
China 0 9 0 0 0
Colombia 3 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 23 5 0 0 0
Hong Kong 3 18 14 18 25
Hungary 4 1 0 0 0
India 9 2 0 0 0
Indonesia 0 7 2 0 0
Israel 1 1 0 0 0
Mexico 9 0 0 0 0
Peru 2 0 0 0 0
Poland 14 3 12 0 0
Russia 27 1 0 0 0
Saudi Arabia 4 3 0 0 0
South Africa 30 11 37 73 0
South Korea 2 8 0 0 0
Thailand 3 7 0 28 1
Venezuela 8 1 0 0 0
Memorandum:          
Australia 19 29 13 17 43
Canada 10 28 7 8 19
France 44 75 73 54 63
Germany 61 62 64 56 99
Japan 61 29 44 28 16
United Kingdom 10 26 44 36 13
United States 81  85 78 83 95
a. By country of residence.
Note: For some emerging-market economies, the figures may be overestimates because
it is assumed that all loans not denominated in a major currency are denominated in the
domestic currency.
Source: Hawkins and Turner (2000).
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that a Polish or Czech corporation issues debt denominated in US dol-
lars but would really prefer to have a debt denominated in local cur-
rency (i.e., Polish zlotys or Czech koruny). It might then swap out of the
dollar debt into zloty or koruna debt (using the swap market); alterna-
tively, it could hedge its exposure by purchasing a forward exchange
contract or a foreign exchange option.18 The original currency composi-
tion of debt would then not be a reliable indicator of the ability to avoid
a large currency mismatch.19
The existence of hedging markets would be only a minor technicality
if these markets were tiny relative to hedging demand, if available ma-
turity was very short, and if creditworthiness requirements were so stringent
as to qualify only very few emerging-market borrowers. But in conver-
sations with traders and market-makers, I did not get the impression
that such a characterization fit what is happening on the ground, at least
in some subset of emerging economies.20 For example, one market par-
ticipant who specializes in currency hedges for European emerging economies
observed that if recent trends continue, the market for hedging instru-
ments in Poland would soon (within a year or two) be larger than that
in South Africa.
More broadly, discussions with market participants suggest that there
is now a top tier of emerging-market economies where currency hedging
facilities have relatively good liquidity and maturity. Without pretend-
ing to much precision, this top tier would include Hong Kong, Mexico,
Poland, Singapore, and South Africa;21 for a few of these economies, ma-
turities on swaps could even go out as far as 5 to 10 years. A second tier
would include Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, and
Taiwan, where liquidity and other desirable market characteristics are
improving but are not as good as in the top tier. Yet a third tier might
encompass Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Thailand, Turkey,
and Venezuela. And so on.
18. See Morales (2001) for a discussion of derivative instruments in the Czech Republic
and Poland.
19. In evaluating the original sin hypothesis, one also needs to take into account local
currency denominated loans made in emerging economies by affiliates of foreign owned
banks. These have become much more important relative to international bank loans
during the past decade, see Goldstein and Turner (2002).
20. See Goldstein and Turner (2002) for further discussion of hedging markets in emerging-
market economies.
21. According to the most recent Bank for International Settlements survey of foreign
exchange and derivative market activity, the emerging-market economy currencies with
the highest (total) foreign exchange market turnover in (April) 2001 were (in descending
order) Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar, South African rand, Mexican peso, Korean
won, and Polish zloty. (Bank for International Settlements, “Central Bank Survey of
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in April 2001: Preliminary Global
Data,” press release, Basle, October 2001.)
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The hedging instruments that were available and/or are most in use
seem to depend, inter alia, on an economy’s capital market policies as
well as on its macroeconomic and debt histories. For example, wherever
emerging-market economies have adopted measures to limit the offshore
trading of their currencies or to restrict capital flows, nondeliverable for-
wards were usually the hedging instrument of choice (rather than in-
struments that require actual delivery of the currency).22 Where there
has been a recent history of pronounced macroeconomic instability and
where inflation rates are still relatively high, there are unlikely to be
maturities available beyond, say, 1 year (and often shorter). Where rela-
tively liquid bond and money markets exist and span much of the yield
curve, one sees more interaction between currency and interest rate pro-
ducts. And where legal arrangements for attaching collateral and for
efficient and creditor-friendly bankruptcy are weak, there is naturally
more selectivity in choosing local counterparties for such hedging contracts.
My point is not to claim that the availability and cost of hedging cur-
rency risk in emerging markets are anywhere near as good as those in
industrial countries. They clearly are not.23 It is instead to argue that
strict interpretations of the “original sin” hypothesis—which suggest that
emerging markets find it impossible to hedge currency risk and/or that
South Africa is the only emerging-market economy now able to borrow
in its own currency—seem far too pessimistic about currency hedging
possibilities (present and future).24
Although most of the market participants interviewed described hedging
activity as “opportunistic” (i.e., as undertaken mainly on those occasions
22. See Ishii, Otker-Robe, and Cui (2001) on the use of such measures in Asian emerg-
ing-market economies.
23. In one of the few studies comparing emerging-market currencies with G-3 curren-
cies, Galati (2001) found that bid-ask spreads on a group of emerging-market currencies
during the January 1998-June 1999 period were considerably higher and more volatile
than those for the yen-dollar exchange rate. E.g., average spreads for the Mexican peso
were about two and a half times higher than for the yen-dollar pair. Drawing on the
1995 Bank for International Settlements survey of foreign exchange market turnover, Koch
(1997) reports that whereas about 40 percent of total turnover occurs in spot markets for
industrial countries, the corresponding figure for emerging economies is closer to 75 per-
cent (i.e., derivative markets are less developed for emerging economies than for indus-
trial ones). Koch suggests that the share of turnover accounted for by derivative markets
should rise over time for emerging economies.
24. E.g., Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999, 330-31) argue as follows: “Critically, these
mismatches exist not because banks and firms lack the prudence to hedge their expo-
sures. The problem rather is that a country whose external liabilities are necessarily de-
nominated in foreign exchange is, by definition, unable to hedge. . . . Similarly, the
problem is not that firms simply lack the foresight to match the maturity structure of
their assets and liabilities; it is that they find it impossible to do so.” Hausmann, Panizza,
and Stein (2000, 16) also observe that “South Africa is the only developing country with
a significant amount of debt securities denominated in its own currency.”
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when participants expected the local currency to come under pressure),
in an increasing number of emerging-market economies there seem to be
markets and instruments available for those so inclined. Moreover, the
distribution of hedging facilities (by liquidity, maturity, etc.) across emerg-
ing economies is better described as falling along a spectrum (or as di-
viding itself into tiers) rather than as conforming to a zero-one pattern
(i.e., one or two emerging economies can do it but all others cannot).
Taking the argument a step farther, I do not believe the currency mis-
matching problem is largely beyond the control of emerging economies.
There is a whole set of measures (beyond letting the exchange rate move)
that could be taken to reduce the size and/or effects of such mismatches.
To begin with, prudential regulations on banks’ open foreign exchange
positions (relative to capital) could be tightened and enforced more con-
sistently. As is shown in table 7.2, many emerging-market economies
have made use of such regulations. Although it is true that modern de-
rivative and capital markets offer mechanisms for those wishing to evade
such regulations and that there have been some notable cases of circum-
vention (see, e.g., Garber 1998), it is far from clear that more rigorous
enforcement of those regulations is doomed to failure. Also, as Krugman
(2000, 96) points out, there is a seeming inconsistency in arguing (as
does the “original sin” hypothesis) that modern-day capital markets are
too “imperfect” to hedge local currency risk but “perfect” enough to undo
any regulations on foreign currency exposure:
You can’t assert that firms must borrow abroad in dollars because they lack
the credibility or institutional means either to borrow in local currency or to
hedge their dollar debts, and then at the same time assert that if dollar bor-
rowing is discouraged those firms will borrow in local currency and hedge it
back to a de facto dollar debt.
A more telling criticism is that regulations or capital charges on banks’
open foreign exchange positions will not necessarily reduce crisis vul-
nerability if banks do not carefully monitor their clients’ foreign exchange
exposure.25 Banks need to exercise particular oversight of dollar loans to
firms in the nontradable sector because the latter do not earn foreign
exchange.
In some cases, regulations on banks’ currency exposure may induce
corporations to borrow foreign currency directly. If corporations have
big currency mismatches when a large devaluation takes place, they will
become insolvent; and when they cannot pay, they also will not be able
to repay their existing bank loans. Indonesia’s banks were apparently
25. Chang and Velasco (1999) argue that regulations forcing banks that borrow in a for-
eign currency to also lend in a foreign currency will be ineffective in reducing vulner-
ability to crises if this currency risk is simply passed on to firms in the nontradable
sector (which borrow in a foreign currency but receive revenues denominated in the
local currency).
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Table 7.2 Foreign exchange regulations for banks
Economy                    Foreign currency exposure
Argentina No formal guidelines; K requirement associated with foreign
exchange position
Brazil Limits on bought and sold positions. New policy will relate foreign
exchange exposures to K requirements
Chile Absolute weighted sum of net currency positions less than 20
percent of K, with weights reflecting currency volatility and ratings
of the country of issuance
Colombia OP between 5 and 20 percent
Czech Republic OP in any currency should =15 percent of K; OP of nonconvertible
currency = 152 percent of K; overall OP = 20 percent of K
Hong Kong Overnight OP (excluding HK$/US$ position) of local banks over 5
percent of K (15 percent for experienced institutions)
Hungary Absolute sum of OPs = 30 percent of K
India Bank must obtain approval for its OP limits
Indonesia Maximum net OP 20 percent of K
Israel No formal limits
Malaysia Each bank has individual net OP limit
Mexico Limit of 1.83 times core K
Peru Net liabilities = 2.5 percent of K; net assets = 100 percent of K
Philippines Maximum short position of 20 percent of K temporarily suspended;
maximum long position of 5 percent
Poland Limit of 15 percent K in any currency; limit of 30 percent for overall
net position; limit of 40 percent for absolute sum of OPs
Russia Maximum OP 30 percent of K
Saudi Arabia No formal limits
Singapore No normal limits; banks must establish, monitor, and report self-
determined limits
South Africa Maximum net OP 15 percent of K
South Korea 15 percent of K (overbought or oversold)
Thailand Maximum overbought position of 15 percent of K; maximum
oversold position of 15 percent
Venezuela Maximum OP of 15 percent of K
K = capital
OP = open position
Source: Hawkins and Turner (1999).
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reasonably hedged on the eve of the crisis, but Indonesian corporations
took on heavy dollar exposure themselves; and when the exchange rate
started falling, belated simultaneous action to hedge in the spot market
only drove the rupiah down faster.
Some analysts have gone farther in advancing proposals to limit cur-
rency mismatching in the private sector. Krueger (2000), for example,
has put forward two suggestions. The first is for emerging-market economies
to make foreign currency obligations incurred by domestic entities within
their borders unenforceable in domestic courts. This would shift foreign
exchange risk to lenders in the industrial countries that are presumably
better able to absorb and to manage that risk.
Krueger’s second suggestion is that G-7 authorities could pass and
enforce legislation that would require their financial institutions to ac-
cept liabilities abroad only if they were denominated in the emerging
market’s local currency; these G-7 financial institutions could then hedge
their foreign exchange risk in the marketplace. My preference would be
to see whether more rigorous prudential regulation and credit oversight
of currency mismatches by banking supervisors and by commercial banks
in emerging-market economies could pare down the size of the mismatch-
ing problem before considering the more radical proposals advanced by
Krueger.
In some cases (e.g., the Mexican crisis of 1994-95), the primary source
of the currency mismatching problem is government borrowing. Dooley
(1997) has argued that because tax receipts are denominated in local cur-
rency and because the shadow price of increased financial crisis vulner-
ability from currency mismatching is far higher than what could realisti-
cally be saved in market borrowing costs by denominating government
debt in foreign currency, emerging-market economies should eschew
foreign currency borrowing altogether (as do most G-7 countries).
In March of 2001, the IMF issued  Guidelines for Public Debt Manage-
ment (IMF 2001). Although this document recommends that debt manag-
ers “should carefully assess and manage the risks associated with foreign-
currency and short-term or floating rate debt,” and “should regularly
conduct stress tests of the debt portfolio on the basis of the economic
and financial shocks to which the government—and the country more
generally—are potentially exposed,” the report stops far short of either
discouraging emerging markets from issuing foreign currency debt or
even of suggesting what might be considered “excessive” reliance on
foreign currency-denominated debt.
Before endorsing the more radical (Dooley) proposal of no foreign-
currency-denominated foreign borrowing, I would like to see the IMF
issue much tougher guidelines that put presumptive upper bounds on
foreign currency-denominated borrowing in government debt manage-
ment and then report on compliance with those guidelines in its Article
IV and other surveillance reports (see the discussion below). Both Alan
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Greenspan (1999) and Pablo Guidotti (1999), for example, have suggested
that simple rules of thumb for reserve and foreign debt management be
considered—such as having countries without a good track record of
international borrowing maintain unencumbered foreign exchange reserves
equal to meet all repayments and interest on foreign debt falling due
during the next year.26
Although all such simple rules have problems (e.g., no account is taken
of potential capital flight), they have the virtue of establishing a transpar-
ent, easily understood target and of focusing attention on noncompliance
with that target. In view of the risks involved, the current IMF approach
to government debt management seems both too general and too weak.
Dependence on foreign currency borrowing in the corporate sector
would presumably be reduced if emerging economies could accelerate
the development of domestic bond markets (for both government and
private debt). This would increase the supply of local currency-denomi-
nated finance. Relative to GDP, bond markets are much smaller (and
less liquid) in emerging-market economies than in industrial countries.27
However, two of the key factors that have historically inhibited the de-
velopment of bond markets in Latin America and in Asia—that is, bouts
of high inflation and lack of government budget deficits, respectively—
are likely to be much less important in the future.
Whereas average inflation rates in Latin America reached more than
600 percent in the second half of the 1980s and still stood at nearly 200
percent in the first half of the 1990s, that average fell to 14 percent for
the 1996-2000 period; for 2001, the IMF ( World Economic Outlook, May
and December 2001) projected that average inflation would fall to about
6 percent. And those emerging-market economies in Asia that have suf-
fered a crisis have had to issue large amounts of government bonds to
help finance their bank recapitalization programs.28 Because they serve
as benchmarks, larger issues of government bonds ought to make it easier
to price corporate debt.
As is detailed in Hawkins and Turner (2000), many emerging-market
economies have also taken a variety of measures in recent years to make
their bond markets more attractive. These measures include upgrading
trading and settlement systems, making tax changes favorable to trading
26. Guidotti was formerly a senior official in Argentina’s Finance Ministry.
27. See Karacadag and Shrivastava (2000); e.g., in 1995-97 the average ratio of total bond
market capitalization (public plus private) to GDP was 90 percent for 12 industrial coun-
tries versus 20 percent for 43 emerging economies.
28. According to data put together by the Emerging Markets Traders Association (EMTA
2001), only Hong Kong and South Korea appear in the top 10 list of the most-traded
emerging-market bonds (and then only in 7th and 9th place, respectively). Note also that
relative to Latin America, Asian emerging-market economies have relied more on bank
loans and less on bonds in their external borrowing.
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and interest income, introducing standard procedures to originate home
mortgages, encouraging the use of international rating agencies, and
promoting pension funds (to create natural buyers for long-term paper).
It is noteworthy that in 2000 local market instruments accounted for
the largest share (35 percent) of trading in emerging-market bonds—
more than trading in either eurobonds (33 percent) or in Brady bonds
(25 percent).29
Mexico’s experience in managing a floating rate system during the past
6 years illustrates some of the measures that can be taken by emerging-
market economies themselves to limit and to deal with currency mis-
matching problems.30 In reviewing this experience, Ortiz (2000) highlights
several points. He argues that the volatility of the exchange rate (under
managed floating) reduces perceptions by the private sector of implicit
guarantees and avoids one-sided bets against the currency. He recom-
mends the development of derivative markets to allow domestic agents to
better insure themselves against exchange rate movements. Peso-dollar
futures and options are now actively traded on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, and a domestic derivative market started operating in Decem-
ber 1998.31
As evidence that a flexible exchange rate regime increases incentives
for firms to internalize the risks involved in foreign currency borrowing,
Ortiz (2000) notes that (in August 1999) approximately 70 percent of cor-
porate foreign currency debt was held by firms that export most of their
products, and that these firms’ annual ratio of sales to foreign debt had
increased markedly (relative to that in 1991-94 under the adjustable peg
regime). Regulations on foreign currency mismatches of banks were made
more stringent, so that loans to nonexporting firms could no longer be
accounted as full offsets to foreign currency liabilities; in measuring for-
eign currency exposure, different weights were assigned to bank assets
of different quality.
The development of long-term markets for domestic debt was also
encouraged to reduce currency or maturity mismatches. The Mexican
government had for many years issued domestic long-term debt linked
to the consumer price index, and in 1999 it started issuing domestic
nominal debt with 3- and 5-year maturities. The World Bank issued a
long-term bond denominated in Mexican pesos, and efforts continue to
29. See EMTA (2001).
30. Mexico’s efforts to reduce currency mismatching, though more extensive than those
of other emerging-market economies, are not unique. E.g., Chile has long issued local
currency indexed bonds, and many Asian emerging economies (in the wake of the Asian
crisis) have taken measures to promote a local currency corporate bond market.
31. Goldstein (1995) argues that the development of hedging instruments is one of the
key reasons short-rate exchange rate variability has had such a small effect on trade
volumes in industrial countries.
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develop benchmarks for long-term private debt denominated in domes-
tic currency.
The IMF can also do more to discourage large currency mismatches.
As proposed in Goldstein (2001), every request for an IMF program should
contain data on the extent of currency mismatching in the banking, cor-
porate, and public sectors; analysis of the sustainability of these mis-
matches (including scenarios and stress tests of what the consequences
of a devaluation of sizes x and  y would be); and explicit conditions for
reducing the mismatch (if the existing and/or prospective mismatch is
judged to be too large). Furthermore, in its World Economic Outlook  and
its International Capital Markets Report, the IMF should be drawing atten-
tion on a regular basis to currency mismatches for all countries that have
significant involvement with private international capital markets.
The Bank of England’s Financial Stability Review has presented some
summary figures on currency mismatches along these lines, and this work
could profitably be extended by the IMF. If the existing data on currency
mismatching are not adequate, the IMF or the Bank for International
Settlements should immediately initiate plans to fill in those data gaps.32
The more private market participants are aware of the magnitude of
currency mismatching, the better the chances that corrective market pres-
sures will be brought to bear before a crisis erupts.33
To sum up, the extent of currency mismatching on the part of emerg-
ing markets is not a given dictated by the imperfections of international
capital markets. Nor is dollarization the only way to deal with such mis-
matches. If emerging economies and the international financial institu-
tions regarded the currency mismatching problem as one of sufficiently
high priority, the size of the problem could be much reduced. It will not
happen overnight, but it can happen. In contrast to the second best ap-
proach of dollarization, managed floating plus seeks to address the root
causes of balance sheet vulnerability and to pursue the first best policy
prescription.
32. At present, the main data bottleneck on currency mismatching seems to be in the
corporate sector. If banks do not have adequate information on currency risk for their
loan customers, it would be useful to conduct surveys to get a handle on aggregate
corporate exposure. Note that this would stop far short of regulating foreign currency
borrowing in the private, nonfinancial sector.
33. King (1999) argues along similar lines that when governments and markets alike are
informed of the potential for future financing difficulties, they will have time to take
preventive action.
My fourth argument is that—though emerging-market experience with
inflation targeting is still limited, and though it must be admitted that
Inflation Targeting as a Nominal Anchor
Institute for International Economics  |  http://www.iie.com62 MANAGED FLOATING PLUS
emerging-market economies face greater challenges in implementation
than industrial countries—there is good reason to believe that such tar-
geting can serve as a good nominal anchor in most emerging economies
that are heavily involved with private capital markets.
Chile and Israel began their transitions to full-fledged inflation target-
ing in 1990 and 1991, respectively.34 Since then, a number of other emerging-
market economies have joined in, including Brazil, the Czech Republic,
Poland, South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand. Some analysts (Corbo,
Moreno, and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001;
Truman 2001) have also classified Colombia, Mexico, and Peru as either
“active” or “transition” inflation targeters. Moreover, the group of emerging
markets seen as “potential” candidates for inflation targeting is larger
still. For example, Truman’s (2001) potential inflation targeting group
includes Argentina, China, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Taiwan,
Turkey, and Venezuela.
Those who champion the adoption of inflation targeting by emerging-
market economies argue that it has significant advantages over other
nominal anchors and competing monetary policy frameworks. Mishkin
(2000), for example, points out that (unlike an exchange rate anchor) monetary
policy under inflation targeting can respond appropriately to domestic
considerations and shocks; that (unlike monetary targeting frameworks)
inflation targeting does not presuppose a strong relationship between
money and inflation (i.e., the monetary authority can use all available
information in forecasting inflation); that (unlike eclectic monetary policy
strategies) inflation targeting is highly transparent and more easily under-
stood by the public; that (unlike fully discretionary monetary policy frame-
works) inflation targeting avoids the time-inconsistency trap; and that
(unlike frameworks underpinned by broad mandates) inflation targeting
focuses on what the monetary authority can do (i.e., control inflation)—
not on what it cannot do.
Skeptics—though not necessarily rejecting the advantages of inflation
targeting—stress that an inflation targeting regime also has disadvan-
tages and that the requirements for the successful implementation of in-
flation targeting are less likely to be satisfied in many or even most
emerging-market economies. As Truman (2001) and others argue, infla-
tion (unlike, say, the monetary base) is not under the direct control of
the central bank—particularly when the authorities are trying to bring
it down from a high level. Corbo, Moreno, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)
acknowledge that it takes much longer for inflation rates to stabilize
when the initial inflation rate is high (say, 20 percent or more); for example,
34. These are the dates of their announcements of a first inflation target; see Schaechter,
Stone, and Zelmer (2000).
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it took about 9 years from the inception of inflation targeting for the
inflation rate to stabilize in Chile; it took about 6 years in Israel.
Many advocates of inflation targeting concede that the long lag be-
tween monetary instruments and outcomes blunts the accountability of
an inflation targeting framework. Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997)
maintain that prospects for the successful implementation of inflation
targeting are dim in most developing countries because seigniorage re-
mains an important source of fiscal revenue (i.e., contributing to so-called
fiscal dominance over monetary policy) and because there is no consen-
sus that attaining low inflation should be the overriding objective of mone-
tary policy; they point out that measures of central bank independence
are typically much lower in emerging markets than in industrial coun-
tries. Masson and his colleagues also report the results of an IMF staff
survey that concluded that (at least in 1997) only 5 of 150 developing
economies and economies in transition would be good candidates for
inflation targeting.
Continuing the same line of argument, other writers argue that
n the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is less well under-
stood in emerging-market economies than in industrial countries,
n other necessary elements in the institutional preparation for inflation
targeting (e.g., monitoring of incoming data, evaluation of inflation
forecasts) are also lacking in many emerging economies,
n the relatively high fragility of the financial sector and the relatively
high pass-through of exchange rate changes into domestic prices make
attainment of low inflation objectives less likely,
n more rapid structural change and partial dollarization impede the ability
to forecast inflation accurately,
n the greater concern for exchange rate movements (fear of floating)
will prevent the low-inflation objective from being “king” of mon-
etary policy,
n yhe higher incidence of government-controlled prices and of supply
shocks will complicate the choice of appropriate price indices for mea-
suring inflation, and
n short target horizons and narrow bands are likely to produce “instru-
ment instability” and/or excessive output losses.35
The response to these criticisms of inflation targeting for emerging mar-
kets has taken a variety of forms. It has been argued that many of the
35. Many of these criticisms are discussed in Corbo, Moreno, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001);
Mishkin (2000); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2001);
and Truman (2001). Also see the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, May 2001.
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problems raised are less serious today than even 5 years ago, and that
some of the alleged “required preconditions” for the successful imple-
mentation of inflation targeting also apply to other currency regimes and/
or monetary frameworks, whereas the importance of some others has
been exaggerated (as evidenced by several successful counterexamples).
In addition, supporters of inflation targeting note that some accommo-
dation in the design of the inflation targeting framework can be made to
lessen the handicaps or special problems of emerging economies, and
that “warts and all,” the overall performance to date of inflation target-
ing in these emerging economies has been quite good.
As was noted above, one of the striking developments of the 1990s
was the sharp decline in inflation among emerging markets. According
to the IMF’s figures ( World Economic Outlook, May 2001), average infla-
tion rates in emerging-market economies fell from triple-digit numbers
in the late 1980s to less than 8 percent in 2000; if a few outliers (Bulgaria,
Indonesia, Turkey, and Venezuela) are excluded, the average inflation
rate in 2000 would be 5 percent. This means that most emerging econo-
mies considering a move to inflation targeting could begin at an initial
inflation rate much lower than 5 to 6 years ago.
Reliance on seigniorage has likewise fallen, reducing the risk of fiscal
dominance of monetary policy. And for those emerging-market econo-
mies that would have to start from a high inflation rate, Chile’s experi-
ence should be encouraging: A gradual but consistent application of the
inflation-targeting regime (beginning with just inflation projections and
then formalizing and tightening the inflation target as credibility was
earned) yielded a significant reduction in inflation (from more than 20
percent in 1991 to about 3.5 percent in 1999-2001), while maintaining
good growth performance. The greater volatility of inflation rates in emerg-
ing economies can be compensated for by (at least initially) making the
target ranges for inflation somewhat wider than in industrial countries.
Central bank independence in emerging-market economies has increased
along with the decline in inflation rates. Mishkin (2000) argues that cen-
tral bank independence and inflation targeting (with the latter’s heavy
emphasis on transparency and accountability in monetary policy) have
been mutually reinforcing.
As was argued in chapter 1, as long as the exchange rate does not
challenge the primacy of the low inflation objective, emerging-market
economies practicing inflation targeting can engage in some smoothing
and leaning-against-the-wind operations in the exchange market. Indeed,
a few economies (Chile, Israel, and Poland) have even made a successful
transition from crawling exchange rate bands to a floating rate combined
with inflation targeting.
Although exchange rate pass-through effects are generally found to be
significantly higher in emerging economies than in industrial countries,
the IMF ( World Economic Outlook, May 2001) and others report that the
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size of these pass-throughs also fell sharply in the 1990s—to an average
of roughly 20 percent during 1 year and perhaps 25-50 percent during
2 years.36 Output contractions after the devaluation, and relatively low
inflation and appreciated real exchange rates before it, seem to explain
these relatively encouraging pass-through outcomes.
With some scope under inflation targeting for both smoothing exchange
rate movements and paying attention to currency mismatches, and with
lower than expected pass-throughs of exchange rate changes, the prob-
ability that the implementation of targeting would be thrown off course
by exchange rate concerns has been reduced.
Financial-sector fragility and a lack of fiscal prudence are always im-
pediments to the conduct of monetary policy and/or to the performance
of the exchange rate regime; there is no reason to believe that inflation
targeting is going to be any less successful than competing regimes in
the presence of financial-sector or fiscal policy problems. Likewise, and
as was argued above, a regime of managed floating plus inflation target-
ing is likely to cope better with external volatility and external shocks
than less flexible currency regimes.
Consider, for example, the shocks faced by Brazil (from Argentina and
otherwise) during 2001; would any regime (other than managed floating
combined with inflation targeting) still be left standing? Rapid structural
change in emerging markets will not only make it harder to control and
to forecast inflation; it will also make it harder to gauge appropriate
monetary growth targets (under a monetary targeting regime) or to cal-
culate the equilibrium exchange rate under publicly announced exchange
rate targets (in adjustable peg or BBC regimes).
Potential instrument instability under an inflation-targeting regime can
be avoided or minimized in two ways. First, the maturity (length) of
inflation targets can be set close to the estimated time lag in the effect of
monetary policy on inflation. Second, the target range specified for infla-
tion should not be too narrow.37
Although sound underlying conditions and good institutional prepa-
ration make any monetary policy or currency regime work better, it
is easy to overstate the necessary preconditions for implementation. As
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) note, the Bank of England began
implementation of inflation targeting before it had full instrument inde-
pendence, some countries that use inflation targeting (e.g., Colombia,
South Africa) still do not publish inflation forecasts, and Brazil imple-
mented inflation targeting with most of the bells and whistles within 4
months of announcing its intention to do so—and this in the face of both
36. These pass-through figures apply to the 1990s group averages for the devaluations in
Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand; see IMF,
World Economic Outlook, May 2001.
37. See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001).
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formidable fiscal and debt problems and a good deal of exchange rate
volatility.
Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) conclude that (relative to indus-
trial countries) emerging-market economies
n have opted for more formal institutional frameworks in support of
inflation targeting (e.g., usually granting formal independence to the
central bank before adopting targeting),
n have relied less on statistical models in the conduct of monetary policy,
n have intervened more frequently in foreign exchange markets,
n have adopted inflation targets with shorter time horizons, and
n have preferred bands to point (inflation) targets.
Perhaps m ost telling, most analytical reviews of inflation-targeting
experience in emerging markets give it relatively high marks.38 More spe-
cifically, most studies conclude that countries adopting inflation target-
ing have been relatively successful in meeting their announced inflation
targets; that the track record on meeting inflation targets has been much
better than that in meeting announced monetary growth targets; and that
inflation targeting is associated with reduced expectations of inflation
and with lower inflation forecast errors. They also conclude that coun-
tries adopting inflation targeting are not “inflation nutters” (to borrow a
term from Mervyn King), that is, they still allow monetary policy to re-
spond to falls in output; that “sacrifice ratios” (i.e., the change in output
associated with a 1 percent fall in inflation) are more favorable after the
adoption of inflation targeting than before and more favorable than un-
der monetary targeting (but not as good as under exchange rate-based
stabilizations); and that inflation targeting has rarely been associated with
a subsequent loss of fiscal prudence.
A final piece of evidence supporting the effectiveness of inflation tar-
geting as a nominal anchor comes from a recent study by Kuttner and
Posen (2001). Two features of their work differentiate it from other “bot-
tom-line” regime comparisons. First, the authors compare the effects not
only of alternative currency regimes (hard fix, soft fix, float) but also of
alternative monetary policy regimes (narrow money target, broad money
target, inflation targeting, and other) and of different degrees of central
bank independence. Second, they measure the effects of alternative mone-
tary frameworks (where such a “framework” is a combination of a cur-
rency regime, a monetary policy regime, and a degree of central bank
38. See IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 2001; Corbo, Moreno, and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2001); Mishkin (2000); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); and Schaechter, Stone, and
Zelmer (2000). Truman (2001) arrives at a more mixed overall verdict.
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independence) not only on the variability of the nominal exchange rate
and the average level of inflation but also on the persistence of inflation
(where “persistence” refers to the extent to which inflation returns to its
target after an inflation shock occurs).
The advantage of looking at currency regimes and monetary policy
regimes simultaneously is that it allows their separate effects to be dis-
entangled. The advantage of using inflation persistence as a metric is
that (unlike the average inflation rate) it should normalize for the dif-
ferent incidence of shocks across time periods. Kuttner and Posen’s (2001)
data sample covers 124 monetary frameworks in 41 countries (including
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment and countries in Latin America and East Asia) during the 1973-
2000 period.
Three findings of Kuttner and Posen’s (2001) study are relevant for
the subject of this book: Soft pegs reduce the level of inflation and at-
tenuate exchange rate fluctuations but are characterized by large de-
valuations. Central bank autonomy is associated with both a more stable
exchange rate and a lower level of inflation. And inflation targeting is
the only monetary policy regime associated with both lower inflation
and lower inflation persistence. In the end, Kuttner and Posen conclude
that a monetary framework that combined a floating exchange rate, inflation
targeting, and central bank autonomy (i.e., two thirds of managed float-
ing plus) might offer the same anti-inflation benefits as an exchange rate
peg on its own, without the proclivity to occasional large depreciations.
To sum up, inflation targeting is hardly a panacea for all the ills that
currently beset emerging-market economies. Yet on the basis of the ex-
perience gained thus far, inflation targeting does appear to be a good
nominal anchor and better than either of the leading alternatives (i.e.,
monetary targeting under a floating rate or an exchange rate peg of one
kind or another).
Concluding Remarks
Given the number of serious currency crises in emerging-market econo-
mies during the past 7 years, it makes no sense to talk about reforming
the international financial architecture without addressing currency re-
gimes. Adjustable peg and crawling band regimes are just too fragile
for a world of large and sudden shifts in private capital flows and of
sometime serious slippages in economic policy reform. Currency boards
and dollarization solve some problems but are impotent in dealing with
Argentina-type crises characterized by recession, an overvalued real ex-
change, limited flexibility of domestic costs and prices, and too much
public debt to permit countercyclical fiscal policy. And plain vanilla float-
ing has limited appeal to many emerging economies because of their
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balance sheet vulnerability to large exchange rate changes and because
of their dissatisfaction with monetary targeting as a nominal anchor.
The best of the currency regime options is managed floating plus. It
would give emerging-market economies a deterrent to currency mismatch-
ing and to balance sheet vulnerability, a much reduced fear of floating,
enough monetary independence to engage in gross-tuning of monetary
policy to counter recessions, sufficient “flex” to deal with large shifts in
capital flows, and a workable nominal anchor to control inflation. If not
managed floating plus, tell me what will work better?
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